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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume III SPRING-SUMMER 1954 Number 2
THE EXEMPTION OF WAGES FROM GARNISH-
MENT: SOME COMPARISONS
AND COMMENTS
HARRY ABRAHAMS AND EDWARD S. FELDMAN
"Small debts are like small shot; they are rattling on every
side, and can scarcely be escaped without a wound; great debts
are like cannon, of loud noise but little danger."
-SAMUEL JOHNSON (in a letter to Joseph Simpson).'
I. INTRODUCTION
NTEREST in problems of the small debtor2 is strongly correlated
with variations in the business cycle. A spate of literature on the
subject will be found during the years of the Great Depression
1 "In fact, only small debts are really dangerous. On a large scale debts are credit,
and if your credit is very large your creditors themselves can't afford to drive you to
bankruptcy, where only a small percentage of their claims could be recovered. I know
another great publishing house in Munich which had grown to enormous dimensions
only because its enterprising proprietor had found out that the easiest way of placating
affiliated entrepreurs was to give them new and larger orders. When it came to the
worst, the printers, binders or paper manufacturers would get a share in the enterprise.
The very bulk of a large boat keeps it afloat, even in a stormy sea, where a small boat
is easily sunk." Franz Schoenberner, Confessions of a European Intellectual, at 140-1
(1946).
We are indebted to Professor Walton H. Hamilton for this happy phrase: see
In re the Small Debtor, 42 Yale L. J. 473 (1933).
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and immediately following," and a dearth of material is easily notice-
able until quite recently.4 We may reasonably expect to be concerned
with these problems for some time to come.5
Practitioners are too well aware of the difficulties of enforcement
of judgments.6 In the case of smaller wage earners a seeking of an
appropriate balance between the interest of society in providing
needed consumer credit for them by providing adequate security to
suppliers of credit and not impoverishing the users of that credit has
led to a wide variety of statutes creating exemptions from execution
after judgment. We propose to examine the exemption statutes of the
States, to compare them for better understanding, and to suggest
some changes to the end that justice is done the debtor, while the
creditors obtain such security as will provide the necessary flow of
credit to maintain our economy.
II. NATURE OF THE GARNISHMENT EXEMPTION
Garnishment,7 we have been told many times over,8 is a statutory
remedy. This historical truth, then, permits us to obtain an accurate
view of the law of wage and salary exemptions by examination of the
8 No point is served by collecting references here. However, citation should be made
to the symposium on credit for urban employees contained in 42 Yale L. J. beginning
at 473 (1933).
4 The collection of articles touching on The Loan Shark Problem Today in 19
Law and Contemp. Prob. (1954) will serve to illustrate the point. It is also interesting
to note the kind of literature to be found in typical and influential periodicals of today
which presumably reflect consumer interest: D. Reddy, "Before the Bill Collector
Shows Up," 135 Cosmopolitan 46-7 (September, 1953); S. Nichols, "How to Protect
Yourself Against Bill Collectors," 137 Good Housekeeping 62 (September, 1953): "...
You should ascertain the true strength of the collector's weapons. He will try to bluff
you into thinking that they are stronger than they actually are. His biggest stick is the
garnishment of your salary. This would hurt you, but it isn't necessarily the catastrophe
your collector would have you think. In most states (sic), except in a few unusual
situations, not more than 10 per cent of your pay check can be garnished at any one
time, regardless of how many creditors are after it. Each has to wait his turn, which
means that you can virtually call your own signals after the first garnishment. Each
garnishment, of course, involves court costs and attorney's fees, which you will have
to pay eventually." Ibid., at 200.
5 Family Debt is Rising, 60 American Federationist 24 (July, 1953).
6 See Symposium, Judgments in Illinois, [ 1951] The University of Illinois Law Forum
1 et seq. (1951).
7 Garnishment is known as "trustee process" in several New England states, and as
"suggestee execution" in West Virginia.
8 For example, see, Cardozo, J., dissenting in Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works,
292 U. S. 190, 208 (1934); Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Per-
spective 447 (1952); and see the brilliant analysis by Mussman and Riesenfeld, Garnish-
ment and Bankruptcy, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1942): garnishment proceedings "are
truly blue-blooded legal institutions that can claim a family tree reaching back into
the Middle Ages."
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statutes in the various jurisdictions and perusal of the decisions of the
respective courts.
Probably the most common use of this remedy has been to reach
directly, or perhaps by indirection, the wages or salary of employees
who have not paid their bills.9 As a solution to the problems of either
the debtor or the creditor, however, the remedy has been of varying
and usually indifferent success.'" Since debt is no isolated phenomenon
to be found in only a few societies, we need not be surprised that
the numerical supremacy of debtors as they gained political power
should lead to the demand for relief from onerous collection proce-
dures. Perhaps it might be stretching historical knowledge to attribute
the Lord's release" to extended suffrage but the exemption statutes
of the various states of the United States can probably only be ex-
plained in this way. 12 As Professor Hamilton put it, "As debt became
more popular, and the people came into greater political power, the
risk was shifted to the lender."' 8
Nevertheless, it may not be a simple matter to discover any con-
comitant relationship between the size and nature of the exemption
of earnings in garnishment statutes and the ease with which credit
may be obtained.' 4 Even though the tendency, as we shall see, is to
greater protection of the debtor, it is quite obvious that the institution
of installment selling has not failed to grow. Perhaps this very growth
9 At least the studies published to date make it appear so. Nugent, Hamm and Jones,
Wage Executions for Debt, U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Bulletin No. 622, Washington, Government Printing Office (1936); Blanshard, Report
to the Mayor on Garnishment Executions Against City Employees: A Study by the
Department of Investigation and Accounts, New York (1937).
10 The charge has been made that the severity of the Michigan statute, Mich. Stat.
Ann., S 27.3399, contributed to undue hardship of debtors in Detroit between 1929 and
1932. Nugent, Devices for Liquidating Small Claims in Detroit, 2 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 259, 260 (1935). On the other hand, the study by Nugent, Hamm and Jones,
op. cit. supra note 9, leads to the conclusion that the large majority of creditors not
only filed few garnishment executions, but did so only on the larger debts. The late
Professor Radin in his classic article, "Debt," in 5 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 32, 36 (1931), sug-
gested that the frustrations of the burdens and difficulties of enforcing collection from
an unwilling debtor were often great enough to induce the creditor to write the debt
off rather than attempt to collect it, which, of course, merely places the burden upon
the shoulders of the debtors who do meet their obligations.
11 Old Testament, Deuteronomy, XV, 1, 2: "At the end of every seven years thou
shalt make a release. And this is the manner of the release: Every creditor that lendeth
aught to his neighbor shall release it; he shall not exact it of his neighbor, or of his
brother; because it is called the Lord's release."
12 See, as examples, Ga. Code Ann., S 51-1301 and Iowa Code Ann., S 627.6. See
also Hamilton, op. cit. supra note 2, at 479.
Is Op. cit. supra note 2, at 481.
14 See Wage Exemption Statutes, 11 Neb. L. Bull. 342 (1932).
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of credit selling, which is so much responsible for the expansion of
our American economy, with its inherent pressure upon the consumer
to overextend himself, 5 contributes the reasons for the necessity to
save the small debtor from becoming a charge on society.16
In any event, the several states17 have approached the matter in
their individual ways but with a certain discernible series of patterns.'
Some states have felt quite strongly about the matter,' others are
not particularly perturbed. 20
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE AMOUNT OF WAGES
OR SALARY EXEMPTED
An examination of the legislation does not seem to reveal any par-
ticular reasoning by which the legislatures have arrived at the amounts
of wages or salaries exempted from garnishment proceedings. Of
course, if they are designed to protect the family, or even only the
individual debtor, it would seem that they should revolve around some
relatively common point and within a relatively limited range,
dictated by historical considerations, geographical placement of the
state and, yes, the cost of living.
However, it does not appear that we can explain the exemptions in
these terms at all, although We may sense a realization of the effects
of inflation on increases in the exemption statutes contained in recent
amendments.21
15 Efforts to Eliminate Some Evils of Unrestricted Credit for Wage Earners, 45
Harv: L. Rev. 1102 (1932).
16 "The reason for having an exemption is a familiar reason which is manifest
throughout our law that at a certain point the social interest in not having a debtor
pushed below the line of bare living into pauperism intervenes and becomes superior
to the rights of the creditor and is recognized by law. It is on this ground that the
minima of decent living are exempted from attachment or execution, that ten or
twenty dollars a week are exempted from trustee process, and that even when a man
is a voluntary bankrupt it is considered wiser to let the bankrupt keep the clothes on
his back than oblige him to surrender them to the trustee for the benefit of creditors."
Smith, The History and Purpose of the Wage Assignment Statutes With a Suggestion
for an Amendment, 5 Mass. L. Q. 479, 485 (1920).
17 We find similar legislation in the various provinces of Canada. Labour Legislation
in Canada, Canadian Department of Labour (1948).
18 Kistler and Machal, A Discussion of Garnishment and Its Exemptions, 27 Dicta
453 (1950).
19 Texas has a constitutional provision which provides that "No current wages for
personal service shall ever be subject to garnishment." Tex. Const. Art. 16, S 28.
20 The Vermont exemption is but $10.00: Vt. Stat. (Rev. ed., 1947) S 1808, V. The
West Virginia exemption is the same amount: W. Va. Code (1949) 5 3834 (3).
21 See the historical note following Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1951) c. 62, § 14,
listing the increases in the exemption from $8.00 per week to the present $30.00 to
the head of the family.
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A. THE FLAT AMOUNT EXEMPTION
A popular, and simple to enact, method of setting an exemption of
wages from garnishment procedure is by establishing a flat number
of dollars and cents which shall be free from garnishment or attach-
FLAT AMOUNT EXEMPTIONS
State or Territory E
A laska22  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Connecticut 22 a ..............
Illinois2 3  ....................
Indiana24  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
M aine25  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
M aryland 26  .................
M assachusetts 27  . . . . . . . . . . . ..
M innesota28  ................
M ississippi 29  ..............
..
M ississippi2 9  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
..
New Hampshire30 . . . . . . . . . .
O hio31  .....................
North Dakota3 2 . . . . . . . . . . . ..
O regon33  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Rhode Island34  . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Tennessee3 5  ................
T ennessee3 5  ................
Vermont36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
West Virginia 7 ............
xemption Limiting Period
$100.00 30 days prior to levy
15.00 per week
30.00 per week
25.00 at any one time
20.00 one month
100.00
30.00
50.00
50.00
100.00
20.00
30.00
27.50
125.00
30.00
30.00
60.00
10.00
10.00
each week
30 days prior to levy
per month for single persons
per month for head of family
each week
30 days prior to levy for
unmarried persons
per week
per week
per month for persons not
heads of families
per month for heads of families
per week
22 Alaska Comp. L., S 55-9-78.
22a Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) V. III, § 8102.
23 Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1951) c. 62, S 14. The amount here is exclusive of
payroll deductions "in the form of taxes." Commissions and profit allowances are
also exempted to the amount of $30.00 per week.
24 Ind. Stat. Ann., § 3-505.
25 Rev. Stat., c. 101, S 55, VI. This is the maximum amount which is exempted. A
minimum amount of $10.00 is also established.
2 6 Ann. Code, Art. 9, S 33.
27 Mass. L. Ann., c. 246, S 28.
28 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1951) c. 550.37 (16). To the principal amount add $10.00 for
each dependent, but the maximum exemption may not exceed $100.00.
29 Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 307, Tenth (a).
80 Rev. L., c. 412, § 21, II.
81 RCS, § 2329.62 (C). We shall note later the percentage limitation coupled with
a minimum amount in the case of heads of families and widows.
32 N.D. Rev. Code, § 32-0902.
83 Ore. Rev. Stat., § 23.180. We shall note later the percentage limitation iMposed
when debts are incurred for "family expenses."
84 Gen. L., c. 557, § 1, 12 (c). 36 Vt. Stat. (Rev. ed., 1947) § 1808, V.
85 Tenn. Code Ann., § 7711, 7712. 87 W. Va. Code (1949) 5 3834 (3)..
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ment. We find that the exemption ranges from $10.00 to $125.00.
Frequently, this flat rate is coupled with a provision that the only
wages or salaries exempted are those earned for services rendered 30,
60 or 90 days preceding the levy of execution. This last provision ap-
parently gives some small measure of comfort, if not real protection,
to the creditor. After all, as most wages are paid at intervals of not
longer than a month, it is not likely that the employer will be holding
any wages or salaries due the debtor for a time longer than that which
the statute exempts. The table on the preceding page sets out the vari-
ous exemptions together with the limiting periods, if any.
If it be granted that some amount of a debtor's wages or salaries
should be available to his creditor, what is to be said for this hodge-
podge of flat amount exemptions? For whatever it is worth, it may
be noted that these flat amount exemptions tend to cluster about
twenty-five or thirty dollars a week. One is hard put to believe that
the head of a family can keep that family together on that amount of
money at this time in our economic milieu. (The Minnesota statute
seems more realistic in this respect, by allowing ten dollars more for
each dependent. 8 )
What this points up, primarily, is that the legislative process, being
a relatively inflexible one, is perhaps a poor means of carrying a
policy of exempting some portion of wages or salary from garnish-
ment execution. As to those states which mean to retain this system,
however, it would seem that a revision and increase in the amounts
are called for and the suggestion is made that more realistic flat
amounts be set, which are more consonant with the cost of living.
After all, it is the small debtor with whom we are concerned here,
and he is usually a small wage earner. Further, he is, therefore, most
frequently affected by changes in the cost of living. But this speedy
reflection of changes in the cost of living is not matched by a similar
rapidity in the legislative process.
True, in a period of declining economic activity the cost of living
will fall, and the exemption may be unrealistically high. The inflexi-
bility works both ways, with equally poor results.
B. THE FLAT PERIOD EXEMPTIONS
An exemption may be established in terms of the period during
which wages or salaries are earned. Thus, several states specify that
wages or salaries earned within an indicated period of, say, thirty,
8AMinn. Stat. Ann. (1951) c. 550.37 (16).
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sixty or ninety days before the levy of execution is issued shall be
exempted from the garnishment process.
The hourly worker or incentive wage earner is not likely to have
a constant wage during this period, so that the amount exempted,
therefore, is not a constant amount. Of course, the effect is probably
the same as exempting all wages because wages and salaries are usually
paid, as we have noted, within those intervals, leaving no money due
the employee-debtor in the hands of the employer which can be
levied upon by the creditor."9
FLAT PERIOD EXEMPTIONS
State or Territory Exemption
A rkansas40  ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60 days
Iow a4' .................. .................................... 90 day s
M ontana42  ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45 days
N evada 48 ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30 days
N orth Carolina44  .............................................. 60 days
O klahom a 45  ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 m onths
South Carolina46  ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60 days
South D akota47  ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60 days
W ashington 4s  ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60 days
39 These statutes are sometimes vague as to whether the indicated period covers the
period of services or the time of payment. In Johnson v. Williams, 235 Iowa 688, 17
N.W. 2d 405 (1945), the creditors sought to reach a sum paid the debtor within ninety
days for work performed over three months preceding the levy. The money was held
to be non-exempt. The statute may then be read as saying: "The earnings of a debtor,
who is a resident of the State and the head of a family, for his personal services, or
those of his family, [performed] at any time within ninety days next preceding the
levy, are exempt from liability for debt." Kennedy and Brooks, Ten Years of Creditors'
Rights in Iowa, 38 Iowa L. Rev. 410,413 (1953), remark that "The result seems entirely
reasonable and not unfair to the debtor in view of the manifest purpose to limit the
exemption to current and recent earnings." A different conclusion, they point out,
would have enabled the debtor and his employer to minimize a large amount by post-
poning the payment and receipt of earnings. Ibid., at 413, note 18. We can agree with
the authors that a different conclusion would have worked a hardship on the creditor,
but we are not sure that simply because the services were performed a long time ago
that the debtor therefore does not need those earnin for present existence. The
Montana and Nevada statutes, notes 42 and 43 infra, for example, are explicit that
it is the period during which the services are rendered which is significant.
40 Ark. Stat. (1947) 5 30-207.
41 Iowa Code Ann., S 627.10. No earnings are exempt, however, from any decree
rendered in Iowa for the support of minor children. Ibid., at S 627.12. But see the
discussion of Johnson v. Williams, 235 Iowa 688, 17 N.W. 2d 405 (1945), at note
39 supra.
42 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) S 93-5816. Where the action is for ten dollars or
less, wages for personal services rendered within thirty days of the commencement
of the action are exempt. Ibid., at 5 93-5817. But, where necessaries are the reason for
the indebtedness, one-half of the earnings are subject to execution. Ibid., at S 93-5816.
See following page for balance of footnote 42 and footnotes 43-48.
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If the legislature is seeking to exempt all or most wages from
garnishment process, this is probably as good a way to do it as any.
Again, though, there is no rationale which can be used to explain why
the periods should vary from thirty days to three months. However,
no charge of legislative inflexibility can here be leveled, as it appears
that a policy of complete exemption has been effectuated by this kind
of statute.
We do find that these statutes are generally coupled with provisions
that the debtor must be the head of a family, a resident of the state,
and that if the indebtedness arises out of the purchase of "necessities,"
"necessaries" or "common necessaries," et cetera, then only a fraction
of the wages or salaries are exempted.49 We shall take up these pro-
visions separately below.
C. FLAT RATE EXEMPTIONS
Instead of setting a flat amount of money which cannot be touched
or earnings during a given recent period, the legislature may exempt
wages and salaries up to a certain percentage due or to become due.
The rate may vary from zero per cent to one hundred per cent. In the
former case this would mean no exemption at all-a situation which
does not exist in any state. In the latter case would be meant total
exemption-a situation which does exist in at least three states.
Quantitative studies would be desirable in these latter instances
to enable us to determine whether or not, if wages are not subject to
garnishment, the availability of credit to the wage earner or lower
salaried worker is restricted in any way. On the surface, and not
reasoning from experience, it would seem that creditors would per-
While this is a head-of-family type exemption, unmarried men or women over age
sixty are similarly entitled to exemptions. Ibid., at S 93-5819.
48 Nev. Comp. L. (Supp., 1931-1941) S 8844, 8. This is a head-of-family exemption
and if debts are incurred for the "common necessaries of life" one-half the stated
earnings are subject to garnishment.
44 N.C. Gen. Stat., S 1-362.
45 Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 850. Tit. 31, § 1, 17, dealing with homesteads and
exemptions generally, provides, however, that only seventy-five per cent of all current
wages or earnings for personal or professional services earned during the last ninety
days should be exempt from attachment or execution. Although this section was adopted
subsequently to the adoption of Tit. 12, § 850, it has been held that the latter section
was not repealed thereby. Norton Motor Sales Co. v. Johnson, 110 Okla. 174, 237 Pac.
128 (1925).
46 S.C. Code (1952) S 10-1731.
47 S.D. Code (1939) § 33.12404. 48 Wash. Rev. Code, § 7.32.280.
49 See the Montana and Nevada statutes, notes 42 and 43 supra.
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force seek other security which in most instances the individual
debtor-to-be would not have. Have creditors been ready to assume
the risks here involved, or is other security available?
We may note before passing to a tabular presentation of the
statutory provisions that no minimum or maximum limitations have
been coupled with the percentages exempted. (Such statutes are pre-
sented in the next section.) Thus, no matter how small the earnings
of the debtor, the creditor may be able to obtain some part of them
as satisfaction of his claim. Conceivably, hardship may be unduly im-
posed on the debtor, and it would appear that some minimum flat
amount should be set up in the statute, where this kind of exemption
is retained, below which earnings are not subject to execution.
On the other hand, the percentage statute, either with or without
limitations, does give the debtor having larger earnings from wages
or salaries a better break than the flat amount kind of statute. In the
latter instance, if the exemption is quite low, the exposure of the
balance of his earnings to garnishment execution is quite broad. The
percentage limitation minimizes that hardship.
1. Flat Rate Exemptions ('with No Limitations).-
State or Territory Rate of Exemption
A labam a 50  .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 per cent
Florida5 ' ......................................... 100 per cent
H aw aii 52  .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 per cent of wages of
$100 or under; 80 per
cent of wages in ex-
cess of $100
N ebraska53  .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 per cent
Pennsylvania54  .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 per cent
T exas 55  .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 per cent
50 Ala. Code, Tit. 7, § 630. The garnishee must hold forty per cent of wages, salaries,
and other. compensation until such time as the sum shown to be due is accumulated.
51 Fla. Star. Ann., § 222.11. The exemption accrues only to the head of a family.
52 Hawaii Rev. L. (1945) § 10303.
53 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943, reissued 1948) § 25-1558. The exemption accrues only to
the head of a family.
54 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon) Tit. 42, § 886.
55 Tex. Const. Art. 16, § 28; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, rev. ed., 1925)
Art. 4099. The Constitution and statute exempt "current wages." "Current wages"
are compensation for personal services to be paid periodically or from time to time.
Radford Grocery Co. v. McKean, 41 S. W. 2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App., 1931). Past due
wages left with an employer because they could not be collected by the wage earner
have been held to be current wages, while exempt but past due wages voluntarily left
with the employer have been held not to be current wages. See Davidson v. Logeman
Chair Co., 41 S. W. 824 (Tex. Civ. App., 1897).
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2. Flat Rate Exemptions (,with Limitations).-By far the most
popular type of exemption statute is the flat percentage rate of exemp-
tion with some minimum amount reserved to the debtor when the
earnings fall below a certain level. This limitation would seem to be
the most suitable kind of protection to the debtor, while still giving
creditors some security, of all the kinds examined to this point. We
may repeat that the percentage exemption does help the larger wage
earner more than the flat amount exemption, and to that extent in
inflationary periods or in times of genuine prosperity works substantial
justice without requiring statutory change. The exemption by per-
centage rate, therefore, does not require the legislature constantly to
examine changes in the business cycle.
The limitations may be expressed in minimum and maximum
amounts of money. Thus, so many per cent of wages may be exempted,
but if wages earned fall below X dollars the entire amount shall be
exempted, and if the wages earned exceed Y dollars, no amount over
Y dollars shall be exempted.
The limitations may also be expressed in terms of time, so that only
Z per cent of wages earned within the thirty, sixty or ninety days
preceding the levy are available as security to the creditor.
The limitations may also be varied depending upon whether the
purchases are for necessaries and so on. These provisions will be dis-
cussed as a group below.
Footnotes to chart on page 163:
56 Ariz. Code (1939) § 25-217.
57Code of Civil Procedure (Deering) S 690.11.
58 Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 93, § 16.
59 Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, S 4913.
60 Ga. Code Ann., S 46-208.
61 Idaho Code, S 11-205, 7.
62 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) S 60-3494-95.
6 8 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) § 427.010 (2) and (3).
64 Mich. Stat. Ann., 5 27.3399.
65 Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon) S 525.030. This is a head of family exemption.
66 N. J. Star. Ann., 2A: 17-56.
66a N.M. Star. (1941) S 22-227.
67 Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 78-23-1. This is a head of family exemption.
68 Va. Code (1950) 1 34-29.
69 Wis. Stat. (1951) S 272.18.
t Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) S 3-4713. This is a head of family type exemption.
FLAT RATE EXEMPTIONS (WITH LIMITATIONS)
State or Territory
A rizona56  ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C alifornia 57 ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C olorado 58  ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D elaw are5 9  ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
G eorgia6o  ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Idah o1  ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
K ansas62  ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
K entucky6 3 ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
M ichigan6 4  ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
M issouri6 5  ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
N ew Jersey 66  ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
N ew M exico 6a .......................
U tah67  ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V irginia68  ...... ......................
W isconsin 69 ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W yom ing70 ..........................
Rate of Exemption
50 per cent (30 days)
50 per cent (30 days)
60 per cent (not less than $5 per
week)
90 per cent in New Castle County
60 per cent in Kent or Sussex
County (maximum of $50)
50 per cent (not less than $1.25
of daily, weekly or monthly
wages)
75 per cent (30 days; maximum of
$100 at any one time)
90 per cent plus $4 court costs
(3 months)
90 per cent of earnings of $75.00
per month or less; $67.50 maxi-
mum in all other cases
60 per cent (minimum of $12 per
week, maximum of $30 per
week; minimum of $24 bi-week-
ly, maximum of $60 bi-weekly;
minimum of $30 beyond, maxi-
mum of $60 beyond all above
for householder with family.
Non-householder has mini-
mum of $10 and maximum of
$20.)
90 per cent (30 days)
90 per cent (where income exceeds
$2500 per year court may order
larger percentage)
80 per cent of $75 or less for last
30 days' service plus all above
$75
50 per cent (not less than $50)
75 per cent (minimum of $50 per
month, maximum of $150 per
month). Non-head of family
has one-half this exemption.
60 per cent (for individual with-
out dependents, 30 days. Mini-
mum of $75, maximum of $100.
Exemptions may be computed
on 90 days basis at election of
debtor. For individual with de-
pendents the minimum is $100
and the maximum is increased
by $20 per dependent not to
exceed 85 per cent of income of
debtor.)
50 per cent (60 days)
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D. FINAL COMMENTS ON AMOUNTS OF EXEMPTION
Having set out rather comprehensively the kinds of exemption
statutes, we may note at least one state not mentioned, but which
perhaps has the most sensible and flexible approach to the problem.
The statute in Louisiana provides that in the event of garnishment
"a judgment shall be rendered by the court of competent jurisdiction
in which the garnishment proceedings may be pending fixing the
portion of such wage, salary, commission or other compensation as
may be exempt, as provided by law and providing for the payment of
the seizing creditor, of whatever sum for which judgment may be
obtained, out of the portion of such compensation which is not
exempt. '71
No flat amount, rate, or limitations are there to bind the court in
seeking an equitable solution to the distress of the debtor and require-
ments of the creditor. If some standards were established for the court
to be governed by, it would make more certain that justice would be
dispensed equally in all cases. Thus, the court might be required to
consider the circumstances of the defendant, including his family
status, any other actions pending or judgments outstanding against
him, the amount of defendant's income and the amount of the claim or
demand.
In New Jersey an exemption of 90 per cent is given but the court
has discretion to decrease the percentage in cases where the debtor
earns more than $2500 per year.72 This discretion is unfettered and
subject, therefore, to arbitrary decision.
IV. SOME OTHER PHASES OF THE EXEMPTION STATUTES
We have seen from the preceding tables that statutes have other
provisions qualifying the arithmetical computations to be made. These
include the kind of services for which the earnings are due, the
dependency status of the defendant and what the purchases by the
defendant or others were made for.
A. SERVICES PAID FOR
In almost every state it is specified that the wages or salaries ex-
empted from garnishment process must be for personal services.
Where the phrase "personal services" is not set out in these words
71 La. Rev. Star., § 13:3921. A similar provision exists as to commission employees.
Ibid., at § 13-3926.
72 Statute cited note 66 supra.
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there can be no mistake that such is intended.73 However, no par-
ticular problems seem to have arisen in the reported cases where the
kind of services rendered has been a serious issue.74
B. DEPENDENCY STATUS OF THE DEBTOR
The large majority of statutes provide that the exemption accrues
only to the "householder," "head of a family," or debtor whose labor
supports a family. Apparently, the debtor who is none of these has
no problem of existence as far as these statutes are concerned. We
think, however, that it is time that states provide similar exemptions
in the case of single persons who may have no dependents and who
may become a charge on society as easily as may the head of the
family. To hold otherwise is to continue a ridiculous and unsound
policy.75
C. THE NECESSITY FOR THE EXEMPTION
Examination of the statutes reveals further that the exemptions will
not be permitted to accrue to the debtor in many cases unless he can
demonstrate by affidavit that the money exempted is necessary to
support either himself or his family. Where the statute requires the
debtor to be the head of a family before the exemption accrues, it
seems rather doubtful that any creditor could successfully disprove
the affiant's claims. In any event, it will be a debtor utterly devoid of
literary ability who could not affirm that the statutory exemption is
needed to survive. Most jurisdictions still require a showing, however,
as follows: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina,
73 So in Arkansas the exemption exists for the "wages of all laborers and mechanics,"
Ark. Stat. (1947) § 30-207; in Colorado "wages or earnings of any debtor," Colo. Stat.
Ann. (193S) c. 93, § 16; in Delaware "labor or service," Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10,
S 4913.
74 The accrued salary of a corporation executive for the performance of purely
managerial duties was exempt from garnishment as a sum of money due for "personal
labor or services." White v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532 (Fla., 1953).
75 States or territories providing no exemptions for single persons without depend-
ents are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois (the debtor must also be
residing with the family of which he is the head), Indiana, Iowa (see the interesting
discussion of attempts to liberalize the Iowa exemptions: Note, Personal Property
Exemptions in Iowa: An Analysis and Some Suggested Changes, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 76,
82, 84 (1950); Fisher, A Practitioner's View of Iowa Exemption Laws, 36 Iowa L. Rev.
525 (1951), Kansas, Missouri, Montana (however unmarried men and women over age
sixty are entitled to the same exemptions! Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) S 93-5817),
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and West Virginia.
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Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington
and Wyoming.
D. THE EXEMPTION AS LIMITED BY THE PURCHASE OF NECESSARIES
A conception will be found in the statutes that where the pur-
chases leading to the indebtedness for which the garnishment is
sought have been made for items characterized as necessary, all or at
least a great part of the debtor's earnings should be exposed to the
creditor. There is sound reason for this, it would appear, since the
exemption of wages from garnishment is not intended to be a haven
to protect the debtor from just claims, but is to keep him and his
family from becoming charges on society. If the indebtedness is for
those very things which keep the family in existence, such as food,
clothing and shelter, why should not the debtor pay for them? The
amount exempted in the first place is presumably left to him for that
very purpose.
The statutes usually declare that the exemption does not accrue to
the same extent as set out above in the event the debts are founded
upon actual necessaries furnished to the defendant, say, for his family
or his dependents. Necessaries may be simple "necessaries of life,"7T6
"necessities of life,"77 "common necessaries of life,"'78 "actual neces-
saries,"'18 or "family expenses." 80 Further, in some states,8' an order
to support minor children will lose for the defendant his exemption.
In a few states the exemption will be set aside if the indebtedness is
incurred for "board or lodging" or both.8
Finally, several states will not exempt from garnishment proceed-
ings indebtedness arising out of wages due for manual labor from the
judgment debtor to the creditor. 8
76 Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, 5 4913 (B). This applies only in New Castle County.
77N.M. Stat. (1941) S 22.227.
78 Cal. Code of Civil Procedure (Deering) S 690.11(a). See Los Angeles Finance
Co. v. Flores, 110 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 850 (1952), holding that a watch sold to debtor's
wife to present to defendant as a birthday gift was not a "common necessary of life"
which means "those things which are commonly required by persons for the sustenance
of life regardless of their employment or status." Ibid., at 856. See also Mont. Rev. Code
Ann. (1947) S 93-5816 (one half earnings); Nev. Comp. L. (Supp., 1931-1941) § 8844,
918 (one half of earnings).
79 Idaho Code Ann., S 11-205, 7.
80 Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) 5 23-180 (one half of earnings).
81 For example, Iowa. See Iowa Code Ann., S 627.12.
82 Thus even Pennsylvania, which exempts all wages from garnishment, permits
attachment in this case. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon) Tit. 42, S 621. See also Del. Code
Ann., S 4913.
$$Pennsylvania is good example, again. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon) Tit. 42, 5 232.
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E. EXEMPTION OF WAGES OF MINORS
As the earnings of minors may well be the property of the parents,
some states have exempted these earnings from garnishment proceed-
ings against the parents. So the Virginia statute 4 reads that "The
wages of a minor shall not be liable to garnishment or otherwise liable
to the payment of the debts of the parents."
F. REQUIREMENT OF RESIDENCE
Frequently, it is required that before the exemption accrues the
debtor must be a resident of the state.' This by no means is a uni-
versal condition to exemption and we are not sure that it serves any
useful purpose in light of the avowed purposes of the exemptions.
Statutes are also found which provide that where the wages are
earned and payable outside the state and where the cause of action
arose outside the state no garnishment procedure is available if the
garnishee pleads the exemption. 6
G. WAIVER OF THE EXEMPTION
Some differences exist among the states as to whether the debtor
may waive the exemption. On principle it does not seem that such
waiver should be permitted, as the purpose of the exemptions is to
benefit society by keeping the debtor and his dependents from becom-
ing charges on society. It is not too difficult to obtain from a wage-
earning purchaser a consent to waive the exemption, and to permit
the waiver would seem to be permitting an overreaching on the part
of potential creditors which is not needed or desirable.
In Maryland, the Court of Appeals had held 7 that the exemption
from the attachment of wages could be waived by an employee. The
Legislature promptly repealed and reenacted the statute, declaring
in the preamble to the Act as follows: s8
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in a recent decision has held that a wage
earner may, by stipulation in a promissory note authorizing judgment by
confession without summons or trial, waive his one hundred dollar wage
exemption granted by Statute. It is the sense of the General Assembly that
84Va. Code (1950) § 34-33. Wages of wife and minors are exempt: Maine Rev.
Stat. (8th Revision) c. 101, S 55, VI; N.H. Rev. L., c. 412, § 21, III.
85 For example, Iowa. Iowa Code Ann., S 627.10.
86 Kentucky is an illustration. Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) S 427.050.
87 In Lawrence v. Commercial Banking Corporation, 165 Md. 559, 169 Atl. 69
(1933).
88 Md. L. (Special Sess., 1933) c. 104, at 294.
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the real legislative intent in the passage of this Exemption Statute as amended
from time to time, was to create a hundred dollar wage exemption which the
laborer or wage earner might not waive, and it is the intent and desire of the
General Assembly by the repeal and re-enactment of this Exemption Statute
so to change the wording of this Statute that it clearly and unmistakably
expresses the intention which the General Assembly believes was sought to be
expressed in the passage of the original Act and amendments thereto. It is the
sense of the General Assembly that to permit a wage earner to waive this
exemption would frequently result in depriving not only the wage earner, but
his dependents of the necessities of life, thus rendering him and such de-
pendents a charge upon the community.
On the other hand, Minnesota expressly permits the waiver."9 We
believe the interests of society are best served by not permitting the
waiver.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this brief recounting of the law on exemptions in garnishment,
it should be apparent that the wide diversity of laws has served of
value in enabling us to discover the best means of accomplishing our
objectives. But we will be the first to observe that this review is only a
piece-meal approach to the problem of the defaulting small debtor.
Without question, consideration of this area of collection devices
should be made in conjunction with the subjects of wage assignments
and bankruptcy. What, for example, is the real effect on society of
the laws of a state which exempts wages from garnishment completely,
but on the other hand permits the assignment of one hundred per cent
of these wages? Further, of what comfort is it to the debtor, or of
what aid is it to the community interests involved, if garnishment may
issue only after judgment, if the debtor has signed a confession of judg-
ment note requiring no process or notice, thus permitting little bargain-
ing between debtor and creditor as to a payment plan.
Nevertheless, our examination, although only a preliminary and
tentative approach to these problems, does point out to the reader issues
which, while they may not be of the most crucial nature at this time, are
matters which touch the average American in a most sensitive area. His
contact with judicial administration at this point may leave a healthy or
distasteful impression. We can, by the changes indicated, work a just
result both to debtor and creditor while serving the interests of society
and thus enhance the high opinion in which our Anglo-American sys-
tem of jurisprudence is justly held.
89 Minn. Stat. Ann., c. 550.37 (16).
